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I. INTRODUCTION
High compliance rates are often cited as support for the pro-
position that emissions trading regulation works.1 The Acid Rain
Program, established by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 to
regulate sulfur dioxide emissions, enjoyed 100% compliance for
the first several years of its life, and no less than 99% compliance
thereafter.2 The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market ("RE-
CLAIM") program, implemented in Los Angeles to control nitro-
gen and sulfur oxide emissions, has reported compliance rates of
over 85% throughout its lifetime. 3
Near-100% compliance rates are music to the ears to those
familiar with compliance rates in many traditional environmental
regulatory programs. In traditional technology-based regulatory
programs, regulators sometimes quipped that it was easier to find
a facility out of compliance than in compliance. Assessing compli-
ance with traditional regulation was plagued by a variety of barri-
ers including the lack of access to facilities, inadequate data, and
the complexity of compliance determinations. In contrast, cap and
trade holds out the possibility-even the promise-of full compli-
ance and enforcement.
But compliance has a very different meaning in the context of
cap and trade programs than in traditional environmental regula-
tion. In traditional regulation, compliance was a discretion-laden
judgment by regulators about the company's environmental per-
formance or its good faith efforts to improve its environmental
performance. 4 Compliance determinations were often subjective
rather than objective determinations. They were based not on
quantitative data, but on a series of social interactions in which
1. See, e.g., Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An
Analysis of the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,411, 10,411 (1996); Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analy-
sis of the Utility Sector's Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Diox-
ide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TuL. ENvTL. L.J. 309, 323-25 (2001) [hereinafter
Swift, How Environmental Laws Work].
2. See Burtraw & Swift, supra note 1, at 10,411; Swift, How Environmental
Laws Work, supra note 1, at 316, 321-22; see also U.S. EPA, Clean Air Markets, Pro-
gress Reports, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/progress-reports.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2007).
3. U.S. EPA REGION 9, AN EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MAN-
AGEMENT DISTRICT'S REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET-LESSONS IN ENVIRON-
MENTAL MARKETS AND INNOVATION i, 1, 12 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/
region09/air/reclaim/report.pdf [hereinafter AN EVALUATION OF SCAQMD's
RECLAIM].
4. See infra Part II.A-B.
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regulators and regulated bargained about what would constitute
compliance.5 A compliant status signaled to the public that a com-
pany was meeting the agency's expectations. With information
provided by agency determinations that companies were out of
compliance, public interest groups had mechanisms to pressure
regulators or the company directly to change its behavior. 6
In cap and trade regulation, compliance is an objective deter-
mination that does not rely on information about the environmen-
tal behavior of a company. 7 A company is in compliance if the
number of allowances it holds is equal or greater than the amount
of pollutant it has emitted.8 In cap and trade, compliance is an
objectively-determined status that no longer communicates infor-
mation about the efforts that facilities are making to reduce emis-
sions.9 At the facility level, compliance is disassociated from
environmental outcomes and constitutes a mere artifact of pro-
gram participation.
This article first explains the different meaning and signifi-
cance of compliance and enforcement in the context of cap and
trade regulation. The article then argues that this redefinition of
compliance implies both a gain and a loss in terms of environmen-
tal policy outcomes. On one hand, cap and trade programs involve
less conflict between regulator and regulated. 10 Interactions be-
tween them no longer involve extensive bargaining-with the con-
flict that such bargaining can often entail-about how companies
should reduce their emissions. Rather, the regulator is merely the
"accountant"-keeping track of a facility's emissions and allow-
ance holdings and seeing if they match at some predetermined
time. On the other hand, cap and trade programs entail the cur-
tailment of a social relationship-the enforcement relationship-
that has resulted in large environmental gains in the past. 1
Under cap and trade, regulator and regulated no longer engage in
negotiations and information exchange about pollution control
technologies and other means to reduce emissions.
Finally, the article proposes the use of compliance plans
within cap and trade programs to restore valuable aspects of the
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part III.B-C.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part II.
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social relationships that centered on pollution reduction. While
some cap and trade programs may be adequately designed such
that the market incentives provided by the program promote the
desired emissions reductions, others may not. A case in point is
provided by the RECLAIM program, which sought to reduce air
pollution from large stationary sources in the Los Angeles area.
By many indications, the market created by the regulation failed
to send the signals necessary to spur investments in pollution con-
trol technologies that were required to meet the cap. Reforms to
the program instituted a requirement for compliance plans, which
then achieved significant emissions reductions. This article rec-
ommends the incorporation of compliance plans within cap and
trade programs, particularly for those programs that are expected
to require the use of pollution control technologies to achieve the
emissions cap.
This article extends the socio-legal literature on compliance
and enforcement into the context of market-based environmental
regulation. Compliance and enforcement have different dynamics
in emissions trading regulation than they do in traditional stan-
dards-based regulation. These dynamics have remained unex-
plored by socio-legal scholars. 12
II. COMPLIANCE WITH TRADITIONAL AIR
POLLUTION REGULATION
The high compliance rates achieved by cap and trade pro-
grams are particularly notable when contrasted with low or un-
quantifiable compliance rates that characterize many traditional
air pollution regulatory programs. Compliance with traditional
Clean Air Act regulations was often a process, rather than an up-
down determination. 13 In broad terms, a compliance determina-
tion was the outcome of a negotiation-sometimes cooperative,
sometimes conflictive-between government and agencies about
12. Several economists, however, have examined compliance and enforcement in
emissions trading programs. See, e.g., John K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chnvez & Barry
C. Field, Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs: Theory, Practice, and Performance,
30 POL'Y STUD. J., 343 (2002) [hereinafter Stanlund et al., Enforcing Emissions Trad-
ing Programs]; Carlos A. Chivez & John K. Stranlund, Enforcing Transferable Permit
Systems in the Presence of Market Power, 25 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 65, 65-78 (2003);
Mark A. Cohen, Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policy, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 1999/2000: A
SURVEY OF CURRENT ISSUES 44 (Henk Folmer & Tom Tietenberg eds., 1999).
13. See infra Part II.B.
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facility-specific environmental performance.14 The first part of
this section explains the core component of traditional regulation,
technology-based standards in the context of the Clean Air Act.
The second part discusses the extent of subjectivity involved in
compliance determinations under traditional programs of the
Clean Air Act. The final part examines the enforcement relation-
ships that developed therein between regulators and regulated
entities.
A. Technology-Based Regulation
In essence, the Clean Air Act ("the Act") consists of health-
based air quality goals that have been implemented through tech-
nology-based emissions requirements. 15 The Act requires that the
[United States] Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") estab-
lish national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for criteria
pollutants, defined in the Act as those pollutants that endanger
public health or welfare and come from numerous and diverse
sources.1 6 Criteria pollutants include sulfur dioxide, particulate
matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and lead.1 7
NAAQS must be set at levels that are "requisite to protect the
public health" with an adequate margin of safety.18
In implementing the Clean Air Act, regulatory agencies have
relied primarily on setting and enforcing industry- and facility-
specific emission-rate standards to meet air quality goals. Based
on studies of emission reduction technologies, environmental
agencies determined the maximum emission rates that would be
allowed for a given types of point source.1 9 While this approach
theoretically gave facilities flexibility in choosing how to comply
with the allowable emission rate, in practice, facilities often felt
compelled to comply by using the technology upon which the stan-
dard had been based.20
The technology-based emissions requirements that imple-
ment the NAAQS come in several forms. New and modified
sources are subject to federal technology-based standards through
the New Source Performance Standard ("NSPS") program and the
14. Id.
15. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
16. Id. §§ 7408(a)(1), 7409.
17. EPA, Six Common Air Pollutants, http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2007).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
19. See Burtraw & Swift, supra note 1, at 10,413-14.
20. See id.
5
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New Source Review ("NSR") program.21 Under the 1970 Act's
New Source Performance Standards program, the EPA was
charged with developing air pollution emission standards for vari-
ous source categories 22 which reflected "the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of
emission reduction which ... the Administrator determines has
been adequately demonstrated." 23 To develop the NSPS, the EPA
typically conducted a study of the pollution control technologies
available for reducing emissions from a source category.24 Consid-
ering cost and feasibility, the EPA would then select the "best
demonstrated technology."25 The emissions rate standard would
then be set at the emissions rate that was achievable using this
technology. 26
Under the 1977 Amendments' New Source Review program,
the EPA established several other types of technology based per-
formance standards that would apply depending on whether a fa-
cility was in a region that demonstrated attainment with the
NAAQS or not.2 7 In attainment areas, all new and modified
sources were required to use the Best Available Control Technol-
ogy ("BACT"), 28 defined as "an emission limitation based on the
maximum degree of [pollutant] reduction.., which the [state] per-
mitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, . . . determines is
achievable for . .. [the] facility." 29 While both BACT and NSPS
are technology-based performance standards, NSPS levels are ne-
gotiated as industry-wide standards while BACT is determined on
a case-by-case basis. 30 BACT determinations take into account
the location and other characteristics specific to the facility in
question.
21. EPA, CAA National Enforcement Programs, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
civil/caa/caaenfprog.html#NSR (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b). Examples of source categories subject td NSPS include
medical waste incinerators, sulfuric acid plants, glass manufacturing plants, and the
beverage can surface coating industry.
23. Id. § 7411(a)(1).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See EPA, New Source Review, http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ (last visited Apr. 20,
2007).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
29. Id. § 7479(3).
30. See Jason Scott Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory
Game, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM
TwENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 359-60 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Came].
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In non-attainment areas, the New Source Review program re-
quires Lowest Achievable Emission Rate ("LAER"), 31 defined in
law as the more stringent of (1) the lowest emission limit for that
class of sources in any State Implementation Plan ("SIP"), unless
the source can demonstrate that such a limit is not achievable, or
(2) the most stringent limit that in practice is achieved by the
sources of the same types as the proposed source. 32 Existing
sources in non-attainment areas are required to use Reasonably
Available Control Technology ("RACT"), defined as the lowest
emission limitation that a particular source is capable of meeting
by the application of control technology that is reasonably availa-
ble considering technological and economic feasibility. 33 LAER
and RACT are similar to BACT in that they are determined on a
case-by-case basis in the permitting process for a specific facil-
ity.34 In practice, however, the technology choices that are consid-
ered by the EPA to satisfy the LAER and RACT standard have
been very limited.35
Aside from federal requirements on all sources located in non-
attainment areas and on new and modified sources in attainment
areas, all sources were subject to "emission limitations" imposed
by states. Under the Act, states are required to write SIPs to as-
sure that each "air quality control region" of the state achieves the
NAAQS. 36 The SIP must include enforceable emission limita-
tions, 37 which may take a variety of forms including restrictions
on the rate or amount of pollutants that may be emitted, require-
ments for use of a specific technology, or prohibitions on the use of
a certain material or ingredient.38
All these standards are similar in that they involve agency
officials in discussions with companies about which emissions con-
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(2).
32. Id. § 7501(3).
33. Id. § 7502(c)(1); see 40 C.F.R. § 51.100(o) (2006).
34. The 1990 amendments required the EPA to establish a RACT/BACT/LAER
clearinghouse which contains information about past determinations. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7503(d).
35. See Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, supra
note 30, at 360.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
37. Id. § 7410(a)(2).
38. See JEFFREY M. GABA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 115 (2005). States had broad dis-
cretion in setting such emissions limitations. In Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 79
(1975), the United States Supreme Court held that "[tihe Act gives the Agency no
authority to question the wisdom of a State's choices of emission limitations if they
are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of [42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)]."
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trol technology to select. In a general sense, the standards all in-
structed regulators to base pollution standards on what was
technologically and economically achievable by an industry or a
particular firm.39 Given the nature of these standards, their de-
velopment and implementation is a highly subjective and discre-
tionary regulatory activity.
Indeed, there are a series of opportunities for industries and
individual companies to bargain with agencies about the stan-
dards themselves and how they should be applied. When the
standards are being developed, the EPA seeks information from
the industry about which technologies should be considered in set-
ting the various performance standards.40 As explained by John-
ston, "[t]he process of promulgating technology-based standards is
a long, costly battle between industry and the EPA over issues
regarding the cost and effectiveness of a particular technology,
[and] how these vary with facility type... ."41 Once promulgated,
they are implemented by state regulators who have the authority
to make them binding on particular firms. 42 At this point, firms
may argue with state regulators about the applicability of a stan-
dard to their facility. 43 Finally, if a firm is dissatisfied with the
standards as applied by the state agency, it may attempt to seek a
variance from the state or federal agency.44
B. The Compliance Process
Compliance with traditional environmental regulation based
on technology standards under the Clean Air Act is best under-
stood as a process rather than a clear binary determination. Dis-
cretion is pervasive in agency decisions about whether a company
is in compliance and what the sanction should be for noncompli-
39. Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, supra note
30, at 353. See also David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental,
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005).
40. Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, supra note
30, at 360-61.
41. Id. at 360.
42. Id. at 361.
43. See id. at 361. Johnston notes that while the courts have held that uniform
technology-based standards are designed to be applied uniformly across firms in the
relevant source category, the EPA and state regulators often take the economic cir-
cumstances of particular firms into account when permits are written. Id.
44. Id. at 362-63. The statute and judicial decisions significantly limit the ability
of the EPA to grant variances. Id. at 362.
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ance. 45 As explained by one commentator, compliance is a "com-
plex process of defining responses to mandates that are often
ambiguous."46 Compliance plans, in which companies committed
to taking a series of steps over a period of time to attain compli-
ance, were a central component of the compliance process.4 7
The "deceptively simple" question of what it means to comply
with environmental law has spawned a large literature. 48 This
literature has emphasized the subjective and continuous nature of
compliance determinations. 49 In many contexts addressed by
traditional air and water pollution regulation, companies had en-
gaged for many years in practices that were subsequently defined
as polluting.50 Compliance often takes the form of a process in
which the regulator prescribes remedial measures and monitors
the responses of the polluter.51 Compliance involves a "continuing
relationship between officer and polluter" and constitutes "a con-
tinuing effort toward attainment of a goal as much as attaining
the goal itself."52 Compliance, in this view, is a "fluid, negotiable
matter" rather than an "objectively-defined unproblematic
state."5 3 Its determination is the outcome of negotiation in the
context of an enforcement relationship rather than the application
of a bright-line rule by the regulator.5 4
A lack of information about compliance rates has prevailed for
many traditional environmental regulations. To the extent that
compliance rates have been quantified, many have indicated sig-
nificant rates of noncompliance. 55 In 1999, for example, the EPA's
Office of Enforcement and Compliance disclosed that major dis-
45. BRIDGET M. HUTTER, COMPLIANCE: REGULATION AND ENVIRONMENT 12 (1997)
[hereinafter HUTTER, COMPLIANCE].
46. Id. at 13.
47. See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure: Develop-
ing Sound Policies for Environmental Compliance Programs, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW
J. 583 (1996).
48. Joseph F. DiMento, Can Social Science Explain Organizational Noncompli-
ance with Environmental Law?, in A READER IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 218, 219
(Bridget M. Hutter ed., 1999) [hereinafter DiMento, Can Social Science Explain Orga-
nizational Noncompliance with Environmental Law?].
49. See generally id. at 219-20 (discussing the differences between specific and
general compliance and other variables affecting compliance).
50. See Keith Hawkins, Compliance Strategy, in A READER IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, supra note 48, at 161, 162.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 165.
53. Id. at 183.
54. See id. at 183-84.
55. JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BUSINESS: DILEM-
MAS OF COMPLIANCE 20 (1986) [hereinafter DIMENTO, DILEMMAS OF COMPLIANCE] (cit-
9
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charging facilities were in violation of the Clean Water Act as
much as 58% of the time.5 6 Also in 1999, a study found that more
than 39% of major facilities in five industrial sectors were out of
compliance with the Clean Air Act. 57
The early years of the Clean Air Act revealed the complexity
of gaining and maintaining compliance. Early SIPs were often fil-
led with sweeping, ambiguous regulations such as bans on "visi-
ble" emissions and requirements to reduce emissions by a certain
percentage that turned out to be infeasible. 58 Challenges and re-
visions ensued, and SIPs often became unwieldy documents in
which "it became impossible just to locate the applicable regula-
tion-to say nothing of understanding or enforcing it." 59 For
many years, noncompliance with SIP regulations was widespread
and carried little stigma.60
Although the Clean Air Act's approach had been to require
the attainment of ambient air quality standards, the EPA turned
toward a more technology-based approach.61 It adopted the goal
of negotiating agreements with all major sources that committed
them to installing reasonably-available pollution control technolo-
gies within a specified time period.62 Compliance negotiations in-
volved discussions about which technologies could be employed to
satisfy the applicable standards in particular firms. 63 Regulators
would often essentially supervise the firm's choice of technology. 64
Compliance determinations then generally involved verifying
that a specified technology was installed and periodically testing
ing studies in the 1980s showing high noncompliance with the Clean Water Act, the
Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Clean Air Act).
56. Joel A. Mintz, The Uncertain Future Path of Environmental Enforcement and
Compliance: A Book Review Essay Regarding Clifford Rechtschaffen and David L.
Markell, Reinventing Environmental Enforcement and the State-Federal Relation-
ship, 33 ENVTL. L. 1093, 1094 (2003).
57. Id.
58. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT 162-65 (1983).
59. Id. at 48.
60. Id. at 169.
61. Id. at 169-70.
62. Id. at 170.
63. See Joseph Kruger, Companies and Regulators in Emissions Trading Pro-
grams 1 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 05-03, 2005), available at http:l!
www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-05-03.pdf [hereinafter Kruger, Companies and Reg-
ulators] (stating that "traditional regulatory programs II] mandate specific technolo-
gies or facility-specific standards").
64. Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 322.
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the emission rate. 65 Often, once a source installed technological
controls, which was relatively easy to verify, the EPA would con-
sider the source to be in compliance unless there was evidence to
the contrary. 66 While the federal EPA retains enforcement au-
thority, state environmental agencies constitute the front line of
enforcement. 67 Because of limited enforcement resources, compli-
ance would often not be assessed until after a violation was
suspected.68
Compliance under the Clean Air Act was more difficult to as-
sess than under other traditional technology-based regulation
such as the Clean Water Act, in part because permits were not
required for individual sources; rather, the requirements on par-
ticular facilities were written into the SIP. As part of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress instituted a new program
under which each major facility must get an operating permit. 69
In its preface to its regulations implementing the new program,
the EPA acknowledged the problems it had experienced in enforc-
ing the Act:
The program will generally clarify, in a single document, which
requirements apply to a source and, thus, should enhance com-
pliance with the requirements of the Act. Currently, a source's
obligations under the Act (ranging from emissions limits to
monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements) are, in
many cases, scattered among numerous provisions of the SIP or
Federal regulations. In addition, regulations are often written
to cover broad source categories, therefore, it may be unclear
which, and how, general regulations apply to a source. As a re-
sult, EPA often has no easy way to establish whether a source is
in compliance with regulations under the Act.70
The bargained-for nature of compliance determinations is ap-
parent in the role that lawyers often play in the enforcement rela-
65. Stephanie Benkovic & Joseph Kruger, To Trade or not to Trade?: Criteria for
Applying Cap and Trade, 1 THE Sci. WORLD J. 953, 955 (2001) [hereinafter Benkovic
& Kruger, To Trade or not to Trade?].
66. See id.
67. Cf Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving The-
ory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1181 (1998).
68. Id. at 1214-16.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (2000). For a discussion on the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990's changes to the Act's enforcement regime, see Michael S. Alushin, En-
forcement of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVL. L. 2217 (1991).
70. Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250, 32,251 (July 21, 1992) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
11
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tionships between regulator and regulated. Given that
"conformity with the law is not self-evident," 71 the meaning of
compliance itself is shaped by lawyers who argue on behalf of
their clients. Language in legislation and regulations has ambig-
uous and multiple meanings, and interested parties strive to
demonstrate that their actions are consistent with that lan-
guage. 72 Accordingly, distinctions are made among types of com-
pliance. Regulators distinguish "full compliance" from
"substantial compliance."73 A company is considered to be in sub-
stantial compliance when it attains most of the standards most of
the time. Full compliance is recognized as an unattainable goal.74
Another distinction exists between general and specific compli-
ance. General compliance refers to the responsiveness of the regu-
lated sector as a whole; specific compliance refers to the
responsiveness of a particular regulated company. 75 Agencies
may also develop concepts of "tolerable non-compliance," under
which regulators in the agency identify behavior as noncompliant,
but determine that formally identifying it as a violation is not ap-
propriate or necessary. 76
Often, compliance determinations hinge on "good-faith" ef-
forts by companies. 77 In effect, a firm might be out of compliance
with a specific regulatory requirement, but be considered to be in
compliance generally. 78 A regulator may take a company's recog-
nition of the legitimacy of his demands and the company's willing-
ness to conform in the future as constituting compliance. 79 And
even where there was a specific action taken by a company to
come into compliance such as the installation of a particular tech-
nology, judgment still pervaded the question of how well the tech-
nology is maintained and working.80 Finally, if firms were
identified by regulatory agencies as being out of compliance, they
71. HUTrER, COMPLIANCE, supra note 45, at 12.
72. DiMento, Can Social Science Explain Organizational Noncompliance with En-
vironmental Law?, supra note 48, at 220.
73. See id.
74. HUTTER, COMPLIANCE, supra note 45, at 244 (stating "full enforcement is ar-
guably an impossible and even utopian goal, not least because of insufficient
resources").
75. DIMENTO, DILEMMAS OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 55, at 25.
76. See id. at 27. See also Neil Gunningham, Negotiated Non-Compliance: A Case
Study of Regulatory Failure, 9 L. & POL'Y 69, 69-91 (1987).
77. See DIMENTo, DILEMMAS OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 55, at 27.
78. Hawkins, supra note 50, at 183.
79. Id.
80. See id.
310 [Vol. 24
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss2/1
2007] PUTTING PERSUASION BACK IN THE EQUATION 311
often had additional opportunities to negotiate with agencies.8 1 In
sum, determining what standards would have to be complied
with, how standards would apply to a particular firm, and
whether a particular firm was in compliance all involved bargain-
ing and negotiation.
C. Enforcement Relationships
Just as compliance with traditional environmental law was
best understood as a process, so too was enforcement. Regulatory
enforcement encompasses not just formal legal action by regula-
tors against regulated actors but the larger social process through
which regulators influence the behavior of regulated entities.8 2
Indeed, a large literature emerged about "enforcement styles" that
describes how regulatory officials assess compliance with the law
and respond to situations of noncompliance. 3 Two styles of en-
forcement, the legalistic style and the conciliatory style, have been
described and used to understand and analyze variation in en-
forcement approaches.*84
The legalistic style is based on coercion. 5 It is concerned pri-
marily with "the application of punishment for breaking a rule
and doing harm .... The primary questions are whether a law has
been broken, and whether an offender can be detected."8 6 Legalis-
tic enforcement involves the strict and literal enforcement of legal
rules, heavy reliance on legal penalties, close oversight of inspec-
tors to prevent laxity, and an emphasis on citizen complaints.8 7
81. See Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, supra
note 30, at 363 n.63 (noting that the Supreme Court case Union Electric Co. v. EPA,
427 U.S. 246, 268 (1976) held that it was appropriate for regulators to consider tech-
nological and economic infeasibility in compliance orders for noncomplying firms).
82. Bridget M. Hutter, Socio-Legal Perspectives on Environmental Law: An Over-
view, in A READER IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 48, at 15, 15.
83. See Robert A. Kagan, Regulatory Enforcement, in HANDBOOK OF REGULATIONS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 387-90 (David H. Rosenbloom & Richard D. Schwartz eds.,
1994).
84. See id. at 387-88.
85. See id. at 387.
86. KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SO-
CIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION 4 (1984) [hereinafter HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND EN-
FORCEMENT]; see also Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, The Enforcement Process in
Regulatory Bureaucracies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 3, 8-10 (Keith Hawkins & John
M. Thomas eds., 1984); Kagan, supra note 83, at 387. Note that the legalistic style is
sometimes called the sanctioning style. See id.; HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND EN-
FORCEMENT, supra, at 3-4.
87. See Kagan, supra note 83, at 387; see also EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A.
KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 93-
119 (1982) [hereinafter BARDACH & KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK].
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The conciliatory style, in contrast, is predominantly informal, us-
ing techniques of education, advice, persuasion and negotiation.88
Based on conciliation and compromise, it "seeks to prevent a harm
rather than punish an evil .... [T]he style is conciliatory and
relies upon bargaining to attain conformity."8 9 Tough sanctions
may be available but are seldom employed. 90 Prosecution is "in
the background, as a veiled threat to concentrate the rule-
breaker's mind on the necessity of compliance."91 Finally, in a
mixed or "flexible" strategy, regulators tailor their enforcement re-
sponse to the situation, using both conciliation and sanctions as
deemed necessary to attain compliance.92 They may initially seek
to gain compliance by persuasion, and if they fail, they employ in-
creasingly serious and punitive measures. 93
Effectiveness and efficiency are the two criteria most com-
monly employed to understand the outcomes or consequences of
environmental enforcement styles. 94 The effectiveness of an envi-
ronmental regulatory style is the extent to which it brings about
the desired environmental improvement. 95 Efficiency can be de-
fined as the extent to which the regulatory style minimizes the
social and economic costs to attain the desired environmental im-
provement. 96 Studies that address the effectiveness and efficiency
of alternative regulatory styles have found that a legalistic ap-
proach tends to be less efficient than a conciliatory approach with-
out being more effective.97 As explained by one commentator,
88. See Kagan, supra note 83, at 387; HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 86, at 4-5; see also BRIDGET M. HUTTER, THE REASONABLE ARM OF THE
LAW?: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH OFFICERS 5-7
(1988).
89. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 86, at 4.
90. See Kagan, supra note 83, at 387.
91. KEITH HAWKINS, LAW AS LAST RESORT: PROSECUTION DECISION-MAKING IN A
REGULATORY AGENCY 42 (2002).
92. Kagan, supra note 83, at 387; see also BARDACH & KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK,
supra note 87, at 124; IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 20-21 (1992).
93. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 92, at 20-21. See also the discussion of
flexible enforcement in BARDACH & KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK, supra note 87, at 123-
51.
94. See NEIL GuNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (1988).
95. See Kagan, supra note 83, at 388; see also GUNNINGHAM & GRABoSKY, supra
note 94, at 27.
96. See Kagan, supra note 83, at 388-89; GUNNINGHAM & GRABoSKY, supra note
94, at 27.
97. See R. Shep Melnick, Separation of Powers and the Strategy of Rights: The
Expansion of Special Education, in THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 23-46 (Marc
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"Business will fight sanctions considered unfair by litigating, by
using political influence to limit regulatory agency powers, and by
challenging the rationality of rules through propaganda cam-
paigns."98 A legalistic style may thus increase the time, cost and
adversarial character of the regulatory process without leading to
higher levels of compliance or more environmental improve-
ment.9 9 There is a general consensus in the literature that a mix
of regulatory styles or a "sophisticated balance" of persuasion and
punishment leads to the most favorable outcomes in terms of both
effectiveness and efficiency. 100
While the enforcement styles of regulatory agencies and even
particular regulatory officials varied, enforcement of traditional
regulation inevitably involved a series of complex social interac-
tions between regulators and regulated firms. Given the reliance
of traditional regulation on technology-based standards, these in-
teractions often involved information exchange and negotiation
about pollution control technologies and other ways of reducing
facility emissions. Whether imbued with a cooperative or a legal-
istic hue, such discussions and negotiations played an important
role in providing information to regulated facilities about pollu-
tion control technologies and in influencing facility decisions to
undertake emissions reductions.
Moreover, the compliance determinations that emerged from
these interactions provided information to the public about the en-
vironmental performance of the facility. As explained in a study
of the environmental performance of pulp mills, "social stakehold-
ers" could exert pressure on facilities to improve their perform-
ance in three ways: they could act as an auxiliary enforcer of
regulatory requirements; 101 they could help bring about a tighten-
K. Landy & Martin A. Levin eds., 1995); GUNNINGHAM & GRABoSKY, supra note 94, at
27; See Kagan, supra note 83, at 390.
98. DiMento, Can Social Science Explain Organizational Noncompliance with En-
vironmental Law?, supra note 48, at 224.
99. See JOSEPH L. BADARAcCO, JR., LOADING THE DICE: A FIVE-COUNTRY STUDY OF
VINYL CHLORIDE REGULATION (1985); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE:
ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY (1985) [hereinafter BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR
PERSUADE]; Robert A. Kagan, How Much Do National Styles of Law Matter, in REGU-
LATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LE-
GALISM 1, 23, 25 (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000).
100. John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence and the Ecology of Regulatory En-
forcement, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 179, 179-222 (1984); see also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 92, at 19-21; BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE, supra note 99, at 182.
101. Any citizen could bring suit against either (a) polluters for failing to comply
with valid emission limitations or (b) the Administrator of the EPA for failing to per-
form a nondiscretionary act or duty. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000).
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ing of regulatory requirements by complaining to regulators; and
they could push a facility to go beyond-compliance in order to
prove "good citizenship." 10 2 In these ways, the public participates
extensively in the compliance and enforcement processes of tradi-
tional regulation. The study found that these "social license" pres-
sures mattered significantly for most firms that they studied. 10 3
III. COMPLIANCE IN EMISSIONS TRADING
REGUIATION
In the Acid Rain Program, compliance rates were 100% for
the first five years of the program from 1995 through 1999, and
99% thereafter. 10 4 In the RECLAIM program, compliance rates
have averaged about 93% since the program began in 1994.105 In
cap and trade, however, compliance rates are delinked from envi-
ronmental performance at specific facilities. Facilities may com-
ply by buying allowances rather than reducing emissions. 10 6
Agencies focus on tracking emissions and allowance holdings
rather than on what companies are doing to control emissions. 10 7
Compliance is an up-down determination, not a negotiation.
A. Cap and Trade Design
The Acid Rain and RECLAIM Programs, the two most promi-
nent cap and trade programs in the United States, share a similar
design. In both, a "cap" is set on the total mass emissions of a
pollutant from a set of sources over a fixed compliance period. 10 8
102. NEIL GUNNINGHAM, ROBERT A. KAGAN & DOROTHY THORNTON, SHADES OF
GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT 51 (2003).
103. Id. at 60.
104. See Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 321-22; See also
EPA, Clean Air Markets, Progress Reports, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ progress/
progress-reports.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). For a complete description of the
Acid Rain Program, see Swift, How Environmental Laws Work supra note 1, at 319-
22. Information about the program is also available on the EPA's website at http://
www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/basic.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
105. This estimate is based on compliance data reported by the South Coast Air
Quality Management District ("SCAQMD"), in Annual RECLAIM Audit Reports,
from 1994 through 2004. These reports are available at http://www.aqmd.gov/re-
claim/reclaim-annurpt.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
106. See Burtraw & Swift, supra note 1, at 10,413-14.
107. See Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 322; see also Jo-
seph A. Kruger, Brian J. McLean & Rayenne Chen, A Tale of Two Revolutions: Ad-
ministration of the S0 2 Trading Program, in EMISSIONS TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY'S NEW APPROACH 115-17 (Richard F. Kosobud ed. 2000).
108. OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGN-
ING AND OPERATING A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL 1-2 (2003),
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The cap is then divided into allowances, where each allowance
represents authorization to emit a specific quantity of a pollu-
tant.10 9 The allowances are allocated among the sources depend-
ing primarily on historical emissions. 110 Over the complianc%
period, each source measures and reports its emissions.'1
To the extent that the number of allowances received by a
source is not sufficient to cover its emissions, sources have three
basic options for compliance: (1) to reduce the source's emissions
to meet the allowances held; (2) to reduce the source's emissions,
below the allowances held and then sell the remainder; or (3) to
purchase allowances in the market to make up the difference.11 2
Each source can choose its compliance strategy, and change it at
any time, without governmental review or approval. 1 3 After the
compliance period ends, each source surrenders allowances to the
implementing regulatory agency to cover the quantity of pollutant
that was emitted in the compliance period.'1 4 There is a sixty-day
period after the end of the compliance period in which sources
have the opportunity to buy and sell allowances." 5
There are also some important differences in the design of the
two programs." 6 The Acid Rain Program is a national program
administered by the EPA. 1 7 It was passed into law in 1990 as
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments, and it came into effect
in 1995.118 The policy goal of the Acid Rain Program was to re-
duce acid deposition caused by the long-range transport of sulfur
dioxide ("SO 2") emissions. 1 9 The RECLAIM program is a regional
program administered by the South Coast Air Quality Manage-
available at http://www.ecologic.de/download/dinner-dialogue/2005/tools-of the-
trade.pdf [hereinafter TOOLS OF THE TRADE).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Cf. Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 320-21.
113. TOOLS OF THE TRADE, supra note 108, at 1-2.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3-23.
116. For a detailed comparison of the design parameters of the two programs, see
Reimund Schwarze & Peter Zapfel, Sulfur Allowance Trading and the Regional Clean
Air Incentives Market: A Comparative Design Analysis of Two Major Cap-and-Trade
Permit Programs?, 17 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 279 (2000).
117. See EPA, Acid Rain Program, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/
index.html (last visited Apr. 21 (2007) (demonstrating that the Acid Rain Program it
is a program of the EPA).
118. Burtraw & Swift, supra note 1, at 10,411.
119. Schwarze & Zapfel, supra note 116, at 280. This article will focus on the as-
pects of the Acid Rain Program that regulates S02. While nitrogen oxides ("NOx") are
regulated under the Acid Rain Program as well, they are not regulated through a cap
17
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ment District ("SCAQMD"), the political subdivision in California
responsible for air pollution control in the South Coast Air Basin,
consisting of Orange County, and parts of Los Angeles, San Ber-
nardino, and Riverside Counties. 120 The RECLAIM program was
adopted by the SCAQMD in 1993 and came into effect in 1994.121
The policy goal of the RECLAIM program was to bring the South
Coast Air Basin into compliance with NAAQS for ozone and par-
ticulate matter by regulating S0 2 and NOx. 122
The universe of sources in the Acid Rain Program includes
almost all electric generating plants throughout the United
States. In Phase I of the Program, covering years 1995 to 1999,
the 263 largest coal-fired electric generation units were in-
cluded.123 In Phase II of the program, beginning in 2000, all fos-
sil-fuel fired electric generating units with an output capacity
greater than twenty-five megawatts were added to the program
universe. 24 The sources covered by the RECLAIM program are
more heterogenous than those of the Acid Rain Program, includ-
ing not only power plants, but also refineries, chemical manufac-
turers, paper mills, and a wide variety of other industrial sources
that emit four or more tons of NOx or S0 2 annually. 125 At the
beginning of the RECLAIM program, the universe numbered 394
facilities, including 392 NOx emitters and 41 S0 2 emitters. 126
and trade program. For detailed analysis and comparison of each, see Swift, How
Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1.
120. See South Coast AQMD, About South Coast AQMD, http://www.aqmd.gov/
aqmd/index.html#What is the AQMD (last visited Apr. 20 (2007).
121. Schwarze & Zapfel, supra note 116, at 294, fn. 6.
122. Id. at 280.
123. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN
PROGRAM 6 (2000).
124. Id. at 6, 8 (2000). In 2004, 3,391 generating units were subject to the Acid
Rain program. CLEAN AIR MKTS. Div., OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA, ACID RAIN
PROGRAM 2004 PROGRESS REPORT: 10 YEARS OF ACHIEVEMENT 4 (2005) [hereinafter,
ACID RAIN PROGRAM REPORT 2004].
125. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., Regulation XX Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market, Rule 2001 - Applicability 2001-1 to 2001-2 (2005), available at
http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/reg/reg20/r2001.pdf; see also James M. Lents, The RE-
CLAIM Program (Los Angeles' Market-Based Emissions Reduction Program) at Three
Years, in EMISSIONS TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S NEW APPROACH 219, 223
(Richard F. Kosobud ed., 2000). For a complete list of types of facilities included in
the RECLAIM program, see, e.g., SUE LIEU ET AL., SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT.
DIST., RECLAIM PROGRAM THREE-YEAR AUDIT AND PROGRESS REPORT apps. A, B
(1998), available at http://www.aqmd.gov/hb/1998/ 980539a.html [hereinafter THREE-
YEAR AUDIT See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID
RAIN PROGRAM 6 (2000).].
126. DANNY LUONG ET AL., SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., ANNUAL RE-
CLAIM AUDIT REPORT FOR THE 2004 COMPLIANCE YEAR 1-2 (2006) [hereinafter RE-
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Both the Acid Rain and the RECLAIM programs established
a series of declining annual caps. Under the Acid Rain Program,
from 1995 to 1999, the cap for Phase I sources declined from 8.7 to
7 million tons worth of S02 allowances. 127 For the years 2000 to
2009, with the inclusion of Phase II sources, the cap was set at 9.2
million tons worth of allowances. 128 Finally, in 2010 and thereaf-
ter, the cap is reduced to 8.95 million tons worth of allowances,
which is about 50% of the amount of S0 2 emitted by all electric
generating units in 1980.129 Allowances not utilized by a unit in a
given year could be "banked" for use in a future year. 130 The RE-
CLAIM program was designed such that the annual weighted av-
erage reduction in allowances for all facilities was 8.3% of initial
allocations for NOx and 6.8% of initial allocations for SOx.Y3 In
actual operation, the cap declined from 40,127 tons of NOx and
10,365 tons of SO 2 in 1994 to 12,484 tons of NOx and 4,292 tons of
S02 in 2003.132
B. The Compliance Equation
Compliance in cap and trade programs is inherently much
more ascertainable and quantifiable than compliance in tradi-
tional regulation. Compliance in cap and trade has the simplicity
of mathematical equation. Compliance is determined by compar-
ing a facility's emissions with its allowance holdings. 133 Disassoci-
ated from facility-specific environmental performance, compliance
in cap and trade signals participation in the regulatory program
rather than environmental improvements.
A source is out of compliance in a cap and trade program if it
does not have enough allowances to cover its reported emis-
CLAIM AUDIT 2004]. At the end of the 2004 compliance year, the universe consisted
of 311 facilities, including 311 NOx emitters and 33 SO2 emitters. Id.
127. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, FROM OBSTACLE TO OPPORTUNITY: How ACID RAIN
EMISSIONS TRADING IS DELIVERING CLEAN AIR 5 (2000).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See TOOLS OF THE TRADE, supra note 108, at 1-3.
131. Scott Lee Johnson & David M. Pekelney, Economic Assessment of the Regional
Clean Air Incentives Market: A New Emissions Trading Program for Los Angeles, 72
LAND ECON. 277, 281 (1996).
132. Compare MITCH HAIMOV ET AL., SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., SEC-
OND ANNUAL RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT REPORT (1997) [hereinafter RECLAIM AUDIT
1995], with DANNY LUONG ET AL., SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., ANNUAL
RECLAIM AUDIT REPORT FOR THE 2003 COMPLIANCE YEAR 3-3, 3-5 (2005) [hereinafter
RECLAIM AUDIT 2003].
133. See TOOLS OF THE TRADE, supra note 108, at 1-2.
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sions. 134 Such cap violations are detected at the time of "annual
reconciliation," a specified date after the end of the reporting year
when the regulatory agency compares facility emissions with the
number of allowances held. 135 In order to solve the compliance
equation (compliance = allowances - emissions) for each facility in
a cap and trade program, a significant amount of data is required.
Specifically, the regulator requires data on both the emissions
levels of each facility over the reporting period and the number of
allowances that each firm possesses at the time of annual
reconciliation.
Strict monitoring, reporting, and verification rules are essen-
tial to the success of a cap- and-trade program in a way that they
are not essential to the success of traditional regulation. As ex-
plained by Benkovic and Kruger, "[flor an emissions market to de-
velop, there must be confidence that emissions will be correctly
measured and reported, that compliance will be verified, and, if
there is noncompliance, that a significant cost will be assessed." 136
If a source is able to underreport its emissions, then it will have to
surrender fewer allowances at the end of the compliance period,
and the cap may be reported as being met, but not be met in fact.
Xoreover, that source will gain an unfair advantage in the mar-
ketplace because it will be able to sell its excess allowances. The
greater supply of allowances on the market will, in turn, decrease
the value of allowances, undermining the incentives that other fa-
cilities have to invest in emissions reductions. As several com-
mentators have noted, without reliable monitoring there is no
confidence in the market: "these data are the 'gold standard' that
backs up the currency of emissions allowances.' 37 Reliable moni-
toring instills "confidence" by verifying the existence and value of
the traded allowance.1 38
The Acid Rain Program and RECLAIM both set in place strin-
gent technology requirements for monitoring and reporting emis-
134. See id.; but see Stranlund et al., Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs,
supra note 12, at 345 (pointing out a second type of noncompliance: a reporting viola-
tion, where a source's actual emissions exceed its reported emissions).
135. CLEAN AIR MARKET PROGRAMS, EPA, CAP AND TRADE: ACID RAIN PROGRAM
BASICS 2, available at http://epa.gov/airmarkets/cap-trade/docs/arbasics.pdf.
136. Benkovic & Kruger, To Trade or not to Trade?, supra note 65, at 956.
137. Blas P~rez Henrfquez, Information Technology: The Unsung Hero of Market-
Based Environmental Policies, RESOURCES, Fall/Winter 2004, at 9, 11, available at
http://downloads.heartland.org/14780.pdf, see also Richard F. Kosobud, Emissions
Trading Emerges from the Shadows, in EMISSIONS TRADING: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY'S
NEW APPROACH, supra note 125, at 3, 30-31.
138. Henriquez, supra note 137, at 11.
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sions.139 In the Acid Rain program, 36% of the regulated units,
together accounting for 96% of emissions in the program, are
equipped with continuous emission monitoring systems
("CEMS"). 140 Installed on the pollution source, CEMS electroni-
cally measure actual emissions of S0 2 and other gases on a contin-
uous basis. 141 The CEMS data is then compiled by the source for
submission to the EPA on a quarterly basis. 14 2 After receiving the
quarterly data, the agency runs protocols to check the data for
completeness. 143 The extent to which the CEMS data collection
and submission processes are automated is considered to reduce
opportunities for submitting false data. 44
In the RECLAIM program, "major" sources of both NOx and
SOx are required to use CEMS and report data to the agency on a
daily, rather than a quarterly, basis. 45 A major source includes
any source that emits ten or more tons of NOx per year. 46 About
15% of sources regulated under RECLAIM are major sources, ac-
counting for 84% of total NOx emissions and 98% of total SOx
139. Stranlund et al., Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 12, at
350; see also 40 C.F.R. Part 75 (2006).
140. JOE KRUGER & CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POL'Y STUD., POL'Y
BRIEF No. 99, CONFIDENCE THROUGH COMPLIANCE IN EMISSIONS TRADING MARKETS 3
n.12 (2006), available at http://shop.ceps.be/downfree.php?item-id=1323 [hereinafter
KRUGER & EGENHOFER, POL'y BRIEF]. CEMS are expensive with an average annual
cost of about $124,000 per unit, amounting to 7% of compliance costs in 1995. Henri-
quez, supra note 137, at 11. For general information about CEMS, see EPA, Continu-
ous Emissions Monitoring Fact Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/emissions/
continuous-factsheet.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007). Other units generally quantify
emissions by measuring fuel input and multiplying it by an emissions rate. See KRu-
GER & EGENHOFER, POL'Y BRIEF, supra note 140, at 3.
141. Henriquez, supra note 137, at 11.
142. KRUGER & EGENHOFER, POL'Y BRIEF, supra note 140, at 4.
143. Stranlund et al., Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 12, at
349 (stating that every emissions report sent to the EPA is subject to a series of re-
views to verify accuracy and determine compliance).
144. John K. Stranlund, Christopher Costello & Carlos A. Chdvez, Enforcing Emis-
sions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable, 28 J. OF REG. ECON. 181, 182
(2005).
145. SOUTH COAST AQMD, Regulation XX: Regional Clean Air Incentives Market,
Rule 2012 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 1 2012A-1-1 (2005), http://www.aqmd.gov/
rules/reg/reg20/r2Ol2-chap-l.pdf [hereinafter Rule 2012 Appendix A: Protocol -
Chapter 1]; SOUTH COAST AQMD, Regulation XX: Regional Clean Air Incentives Mar-
ket, Rule 2011 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 1 2011A-1-1 (2005), http:fl
www.aqmd.gov/rules/reg/reg20/r2011 chap-l.pdf [hereinafter Rule 2011 Appendix A:
Protocol - Chapter 11. Under RECLAIM, a single facility may have more than one
"source." See THREE-YEAR AUDIT, supra note 125, app. A. In 1996, for example, there
were 329 RECLAIM facilities and 4,022 sources. See id. at 1-1 & 7-63 tbl.5-1.
146. Rule 2012 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 1, supra note 145, at 2012A-1-6.
For a full definition of a major source see id.
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emissions. 147 "Large" sources are required to report on a monthly
basis, and they calculate emissions by measuring fuel input and
multiplying the fuel input by an appropriate emission rate. 148
Large sources include those that emit more than 4 tons but less
than 10 tons of NOx. 149 They constitute about 18% of all sources
and contribute about 8% of NOx emissions. 150 Finally, an addi-
tional category of "process units" constitutes about two-thirds of
all sources and 6% of NOx emissions. 151 Process units are re-
quired to report on a quarterly basis, and they calculate emissions
either like large sources or by keeping track of their operating
time and multiplying the time by an appropriate emission
factor.15 2
Both the Acid Rain Program and RECLAIM include "missing
data provisions" to minimize the underestimation of emissions. 53
Missing data provisions set forth the manner in which emissions
will be estimated when actual data is unavailable because of mon-
itoring equipment failure or other reasons. 5 4 The missing data
provisions become increasingly punitive as the amount of time in
which actual data is unavailable increases. 55 If monitoring
equipment is inoperative less than 90% of the time, the emissions
value substituted for each missing hour is the maximum value re-
147. See THREE-YEAR AUDIT, supra note 125, at 5-8 to 5-9.
148. Rule 2012 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 1, supra note 145, at 2012A-1-1; see
Stranlund et al., Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 12, at 349.
149. Rule 2012 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 1, supra note 145, at 2012A-1-7.
For a full definition of a large source, see id.
150. See THREE-YEAR AUDIT, supra note 125, at 5-8 to 5-9.
151. See id. For full definition of a process unit, see Rule 2012 Appendix A: Proto-
col - Chapter 1, supra note 145, at 2012A-1-8.
152. Rule 2012 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 1, supra note 145, at 2012A-1-1;
Rule 2011 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 1, supra note 145, at 2011A-1-1. The emis-
sion factors for the calculation of emissions by process units do not tend to be source-
specific. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (CARB), An Evaluation of the South
Coast Air Quality Management District's Air Pollution Control Program Appendix A:
South Coast AQMD Comments on ARB Draft Program Evaluation Addendum, at 6
(Jan. 2000) [hereinafter An Evaluation of SCAQMD's APCP].
153. Benkovic & Kruger, To Trade or not to Trade?, supra note 65, at 955. For
such provisions under RECLAIM, see SOUTH COAST AQMD, Regulation XX Regional
Clean Air Incentives Market, Rule 2011 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 2 2011A-2-29
to 2011A-2-36 (2005), http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/regreg20/ r2011chap_2.pdf [here-
inafter Rule 2011 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 2]; SOUTH COAST AQMD, Regulation
XX: Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, Rule 2012 Protocol: Appendix A 2012A-2-
31 to 2012A-2-40 (2005), http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/reg/reg20/r2012_chap-2.pdf.
154. See generally Rule 2011 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 2.
155. See generally id.
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corded in a previous time period. 156 Given that the substitute
data is likely to overestimate actual emissions, sources have a
strong incentive to ensure than CEMS data is available. The RE-
CLAIM missing data provisions were modeled after the Acid Rain
Program missing data provisions and are similar.157
The data-intensity of compliance determinations in cap and
trade programs has necessitated the development of sophisticated
data management tools. Regulators must not only monitor emis-
sions, but also keep track of the source's participation in the trad-
ing markets. Indeed, information technology has been called the
"unsung hero" of the Acid Rain Program. 158 Technological ad-
vances in information technology permitted the EPA to design
systems that could process and disseminate large amounts of in-
formation about emissions and allowances. 159 An Emissions
Tracking System receives electronic quarterly reports of emissions
data from sources, conducts quality assurance protocols, and
makes the emissions data available to the public. 160 An Allow-
ance Tracking System serves as the central registry of allowance
transfers among sources. 161
With strict monitoring requirements, compliance determina-
tions are much more straightforward and objective in cap and
trade than in traditional regulation. From 1995 to 1999, all units
included in the Acid Rain Program were in compliance with their
emissions caps.162 From 2000 to 2004, compliance levels each
year remained above 99%.163 Over these years, a total of 23 units
156. EPA, Continuous Emissions Monitoring Fact Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/
airmarkets/emissions/continuous-factsheet.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007); see also
Rule 2011 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 2, supra note 153, at 2011A-2-31; SOUTH
COAST AQMD, Regulation XX: Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, Rule 2012 Proto-
col: Appendix A 2012A-2-34 (2005), http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/reg/reg20/r2012-chap-
2.pdf.
157. Compare Rule 2011 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 2, supra note 153, at
2011A-2-29 to 2011A-2-36, and SOUTH COAST AQMD, Regulation XX: Regional Clean
Air Incentives Market, Rule 2012 Appendix A: Protocol - Chapter 2, supra note 153,
2012A-2-31 to 2012A-2-40, with EPA, Continuous Emissions Monitoring Fact Sheet,
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/emissions/continuous-factsheet.html (describing the
Acid Rain Program's missing data provisions).
158. See Henriquez, supra note 137, at 11.
159. See Stranlund et al., Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 12,
at 348-49.
160. Henrfquez, supra note 137, at 11; see also Kruger, McLean & Chen, supra
note 107, at 119-20, 123-25.
161. Henriquez, supra note 137, at 10-11; see also Kruger, McLean & Chen, supra
note 107, at 120-23, 125.
162. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
163. Id.
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have been noncompliant, emitting 1,195 excess tons of SOx; for
these violations, the EPA assessed automatic monetary penalties
totaling $3,856,513.164 The highest single fine was in the amount
of $1,581,180.165 In addition, over the lifetime of the SOx pro-
gram, the EPA has assessed nine civil penalties totaling $589,805
for monitoring violations.166
In the RECLAIM program, some sources have reporting years
running from January through December and others have report-
ing years running from July through May. In either case, the pe-
riod of reconciliation ends 60 days after the end of the reporting
years. 167 At this time, each facility is required to submit an An-
nual Permit Emissions Program report certifying its emissions for
the preceding compliance year. 168 The SCAQMD then conducts
an audit for each facility that includes field inspections to check
equipment, monitoring devices, operational records, as well as
verification of reported emissions data. 69 When the compliance
audit reveals a facility to be in exceedence of its allowance hold-
ings, the facility is provided an opportunity to review the audit
and to "present additional data to further refine the audit
results."170
While the RECLAIM program followed the Acid Rain Pro-
gram model in designing its compliance and enforcement provi-
sions, there is some evidence that it has not been implemented as
164. Interview with EPA official (Jan. 6, 2006). In comparison with information
received from the EPA in 2005, the EPA's Annual Progress Reports regarding the
Acid Rain Program for the years 2000 and 2001 underreport the number of units out
of compliance and excess tons: for 2000, the Annual Progress Report states that there
were six units out of compliance with total excess emissions of fifty-four allowances.
CLEAN AIR MARKETS Div., OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA, ACID RAIN PROGRAM:
ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT, 2000 at 8 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/
airmarkets/progress/docs/2000report.pdf. 2005 information shows eight units out of
compliance with total excess emissions of seventy tons. For 2001, the Annual Pro-
gress Report states that there were two units out of compliance with total excess
emissions of eleven allowances. CLEAN AIR MARKETS PROGRAM, OFFICE OF AIR & RADI-
ATION, EPA, EPA ACID RAIN PROGRAM: 2001 PROGRESS REPORT 7 (2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/docs/200lreport.pdf. 2005 information
shows nine units out of compliance with total excess emissions of 603 tons.
165. Interview with EPA official (Jan. 6, 2006).
166. Id.
167. DANNY LUONG ET AL., SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., ANNUAL RE-
CLAIM AUDIT REPORT FOR THE 2001 COMPLIANCE YEAR F-38(2003) [hereinafter RE-
CLAIM AUDIT 20011.
168. Id.
169. THREE-YEAR AUDIT, supra note 125, at 7-58; see also Stranlund, et al., Enforc-
ing Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 12, at 349.
170. THREE-YEAR AUDIT, supra note 125, at 7-58.
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fully and has not worked as well. RECLAIM compliance audits,
for example, have often revealed errors and problems. Early in
the program, in 1994 and 1995, audits showed that almost 40% of
reported NOx emissions and almost 25% of reported SOx emis-
sions were inconsistent with the audited emissions. 171 Facilities
also made ample use of missing data provisions, indicating the un-
availability of reliably monitored emissions. In 1995, emissions
estimated according to missing data provisions represented 23%
of total reported NOx emissions and 40% of total reported SOx
emissions. 172 These percentages tended to decrease, such that by
1999, about 9% of total reported NOx emissions and 20% of total
reported SOx emissions were calculated based on missing data
provisions. 173
Importantly, the years between 1994 and 1999 were charac-
terized by an abundance of cheap RECLAIM allowances. NOx al-
lowance prices averaged $665/ton over these years and were easily
available on the market. 174 However, despite this availability,
there was not full compliance. Noncompliance with facility alloca-
tions ranged from 5% to 15% of facilities. 175 SCAQMD attributed
noncompliance with allocations to several types of problems in-
cluding failure to purchase sufficient allowances on the market,
emission calculation errors such as using the wrong emission fac-
tor or making arithmetic errors, and failures to follow missing
data provisions. 176
Reports prepared by the California Air Resources Board
("CARB") and the EPA identified several problems associated with
compliance and enforcement in the RECLAIM program. 177 CARB
171. See RECLAIM AUDIT 1995, supra note 132, at 38 tbl.5-3, 39 tbl.5-4.
172. RECLAIM AUDIT 1995, supra note 132, at 3-3.
173. RECLAIM AUDIT 2001, supra note 167, at F-41.
174. See RECLAIM AUDIT 1995, supra note 132, at 2; DANNY LUONG ET AL., SOUTH
COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., ANNUAL RECLAIM AUDIT REPORT FOR THE 1997
COMPLIANCE YEAR 2 (1998) [hereinafter RECLAIM AUDIT 19971; DANNY LUONG ET
AL., SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., ANNUAL RECLAIM AUDIT REPORT FOR
THE 1999 COMPLIANCE YEAR 3 (2001) [hereinafter RECLAIM AUDIT 1999].
175. Calculated from data provided in Annual RECLAIM Audit Reports for years
1995 through 1999. See RECLAIM AUDIT 1995, supra note 132, at 29-30; RECLAIM
AUDIT 1997, supra note 174; ANNUAL RECLAIM AUDIT REPORT FOR THE 1998 COMPLI-
ANCE YEAR (1998) [hereinafter RECLAIM Audit 1998]; RECLAIM AUDIT 1999, supra
note 174.
176. See, e.g., RECLAIM AUDIT 1995, supra note 132, at 30-31; DANNY LUONG ET
AL., SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., ANNUAL RECLAIM AUDIT REPORT FOR
THE 2002 COMPLIANCE YEAR 5-3 (2004) [hereinafter RECLAIM AUDIT 2002].
177. AN EVALUATION OF SCAQMD's RECLAIM, supra note 3; An Evaluation of
SCAQMD's APCP, supra note 152.
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found that insufficient weight was given to missing data proce-
dures during case settlement. 178 While it found that District staff
correctly calculated excess emissions using the missing data pro-
cedures, the District provided the facility the opportunity to
demonstrate that its actual emissions were lower through other
means during case settlement. Since the punitive effects of the
missing data provisions would not ultimately be felt under these
circumstances, the incentives to avoid the application of missing
data provisions would forseeably be lowered.179 The CARB report
also found "inordinate" time gaps between documentation of cap
violations and issuances of a violation notice and "excessive" time
for case settlement after a violation notice was issued.18 0 The
EPA report noted problems with the automation of SCAQMD's in-
formation systems and delays in facility audits. 181
In 2000, the RECLAIM program ran into other difficulties.
Power-producing facilities increased their power production in re-
sponse to the California "energy crisis."182 Attempting to remain
compliant with RECLAIM, these facilities bought allowances on
the market which caused a drastic increase in the price of the al-
lowances.183 The average price of NOx allowances sold in 2000,
$45,609/ton, was almost 25 times greater than the average price of
allowances sold in 1999.184 Relatedly, RECLAIM's NOx cap was
significantly exceeded in 2000. Power producing facilities collec-
tively exceeded their allowance holdings by 40%.185 Non-power
producing facilities sold so many allowances that their holdings
did not cover their emissions, and they collectively exceeded their
allowance holdings by 11%.186 In total, all facilities together ex-
ceeded the 2000 NOx cap in 2000 by 3,294 tons, or 19%.187
In the wake of the significant degree of noncompliance and
excess emissions, SCAQMD initiated a review of the program in
178. An Evaluation of SCAQMD's APCP, supra note 152, at V-3
179. Cf AN EVALUATION OF SCAQMD's RECLAIM, supra note 3, at 64.
180. An Evaluation of SCAQMD's APCP, supra note 152, at V-3.
181. AN EVALUATION OF SCAQMD's RECLAIM, supra note 3, at 31-32.
182. See Danny Luong et al., South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Annual RE-
CLAIM Audit Report for the 2000 Compliance Year 2, 5-2 - 5-3 (2002) [hereinafter
RECLAIM Audit 20001.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 3.
185. In 2000, power-producing facilities were initially allocated 2,302 tons of allo-
cations, held 4,852 RECLAIM trading credits, but they emitted 6,788 tons of NOx. See
RECLAIM AUDIT 2001, supra note 167, at F-23.
186. See id.
187. See id.
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2000 that culminated in the adoption of significant amendments
to RECLAIM in May 2001.188 Power-producing facilities were
separated from the rest of the RECLAIM facilities and were re-
quired to submit compliance plans by September 2001 delineating
a schedule for the installation of "Best Available Retrofit Control
Technology" by the end of 2003.189 In effect, power-producing fa-
cilities were removed from the market and subjected to a technol-
ogy-based standards regime. Most other RECLAIM facilities were
required either to submit compliance plans specifying their ap-
proaches to complying with facility allocations or forecast reports
projecting allocations for future compliance years through
2005.190 As such, while not removed from the market or automati-
cally required to install pollution control technologies, they were
required to communicate much more extensively than before
about how they intended to comply. In these ways, the RECLAIM
program was replaced by and/or supplemented by a "command
and control" regulatory approach.
After the implementation of the 2001 amendments, signifi-
cant NOx emissions reductions were achieved. Emissions from
power plants decreased from 6,788 tons in 2000 to 1,047 tons in
2002, an 85% reduction. 191 As stated in the 2002 Annual Report,
"[tihe decrease in emission was due to the combination of a lower
production level and the installation of NOx control equipment at
power producing facilities. 1 92 By compliance year 2004, power
producing facilities had reduced their emissions to 541 tons, more
than a 90% reduction from their 2000 emissions levels. 193 Non-
188. Id. at F-30 to F-31. The RECLAIM rules provide that SCAQMD review the
program and implement measures to amend the program in the event that aggregate
emission exceeded the allocations by 5% or more or the average price of allowances
exceeded $15,000). See SOUTH COAST AQMD, Regulation XX: Regional Clean Air In-
centives Market, Rule 2015: Backstop Provisions 2015-3 to 2015-4, 2015-6 (2004),
http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/reg/reg20/r2015.pdf.
189. See SOUTH COAST AQMD, Regulation XX: Regional Clean Air Incentives Mar-
ket, Rule 2009: Compliance Plan for Power Producing Facilities (2005), http:ll
www.aqmd.gov/rules/reg/reg20/r2009.pdf. Fourteen facilities were subject to this
rule, accounting for about 13% of Year 2000 allowances. See RECLAIM AUDIT 2001,
supra note 167, at F-31.
190. See SOUTH COAST AQMD, Regulation XX: Regional Clean Air Incentives Mar-
ket (RECLAIM) Rule 2009.1: Compliance Plans and Forecast Reports for Non-Power
Producing Facilities 2009.1-1, 2009.1-1 to 2009.1-4 (2001), http://www.aqmd.gov/
rules/regreg20/r2009-1.pdf; see also RECLAIM AUDIT 2001, supra note 167, at F-26 to
F-27. Forty-one facilities were required to submit such compliance plans and twenty-
four facilities were required to submit forecast reports. Id. at F-31.
191. RECLAIM AUDIT 2002, supra note 176, at 3-3 to 3-4.
192. Id. at 3-3.
193. RECLAIM AUDIT 2004, supra note 126, at 3-3 to 3-4.
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power producing facilities decreased their emissions by 17% be-
tween 2001 and 2002, with an additional 2% reduction between
2003 and 2004.194
In their early years, the Acid Rain and RECLAIM programs
were both able to boast of significant overcompliance with the
overall cap. 195 Yet, to a large degree, this overcompliance was a
product of generous caps rather than program-induced emissions
reductions. In the Acid Rain Program, the 1995 cap was set at a
level roughly equivalent to actual 1990 emissions, and the utilities
overcomplied by roughly 30% in the first year.196 In the RE-
CLAIM program, the NOx cap for 1994 was set 40% higher than
actual 1993 emissions. 197 The cap did not descend to the level of
actual 1993 emissions until 1998, five years into the program. 198
In most of those years, there was significant overcompliance with
the program due almost entirely to the elevated levels of the an-
nual caps.
C. Automatic Enforcement
In addition to redefining compliance, cap and trade regulation
redefined the roles of the regulatory agencies and regulated firms
and the relationships between them. Regulators are no longer re-
sponsible for either coercing or persuading a company to reduce
its emissions. Rather, the agency is primarily a "banker," respon-
sible for keeping track of emissions and allowances and making
sure the checkbook balances at the end of the reporting year.199
The firm, in turn, is expected to be a "strategic planner," a savvy
financial and environmental actor who knows how to manage his
pollution.
The role of the regulator is that of a banker or accountant who
focuses on the accurate tracking of emissions and allowances. 200
In cap and trade programs, government agencies assume respon-
194. See RECLAIM AUDIT 2001, supra note 167, at 3-4 tbl.3-3; RECLAIM AUDIT
2002, supra note 176, at 3-4 tbl.3-3; RECLAIM AUDIT 2003, supra note 132, at 3-4
tbl.3-3; RECLAIM AUDIT 2004, supra note 126, at F-23 tbl.3-3.
195. See, e.g., Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 321-22, 325;
RECLAIM AUDIT 1995, supra note 132, at 29-30.
196. Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 325, 411.
197. See THREE-YEAR AUDIT, supra note 12.5, at 3-3, Table 3-1.
198. See RECLAIM AUDIT 1998, supra note 175, at 3-2, Table 3-1. Actual 1993
emissions were 24,982 tons of NOx. THREE-YEAR AUDIT, supra note 125, at 3-3. The
1998 cap was 24,678 tons of NOK RECLAIM AUDIT 1998, supra note 175, at 3-2,
Table 3-1.
199. Kruger, Companies and Regulators, supra note 63, at 10.
200. Id.
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sibility for "strict compliance monitoring.'" 20 1 Regulators are pri-
marily concerned with collecting, verifying and utilizing data on
emissions and the transfer of emissions allowances to ensure that
companies hold sufficient allowances to cover their emissions. 20 2
One commentator calls the new role of regulators in emissions
trading regulation "'revolutionary. ' ' 20 3 The regulator's previous
role was "grandly deciding what is best for firms and individuals,
entertaining equitable appeals, and enforcing the result."20 4
The emphasis on tracking emissions and allowance data is ev-
ident in the distribution of regulatory resources in cap and trade
programs. It has been estimated that of the seventy-five EPA em-
ployees directly involved in administering the Acid Rain Program,
approximately 75% are focused on the measurement, verification,
and tracking of emissions data.20 5 The implementation of emis-
sions monitoring requirements is one of the few areas of program
administration that still involves agency judgments to be made.
Yet this discretion is tightly constrained. 20 6 The monitoring rules
in the Acid Rain Program number almost 300 pages and include
detailed standards for the installation and certification of
monitors, quality assurance, handling of missing data, and record-
keeping.20 7 In implementing these rules, the EPA has developed
an almost 500-page online policy manual.20 The manual is
largely in question and answer format, publicizing the responses
that the EPA has given to the many questions about the monitor-
ing rules that have arisen over the lifetime of the program. 20 9
The new role of industry in cap and trade regulation is that of
"strategic planner and entrepreneur."210 Companies can be stra-
tegic and entrepreneurial because cap and trade programs allow
companies a wider range of options about how to comply than
traditional regulation. 211 There is evidence that under cap and
201. Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 322.
202. Kruger, Companies and Regulators, supra note 63, at 10.
203. Id. (citing A. Denny Ellerman, The Next Restructuring: Environmental Regu-
lation, 20 THE ENERGY J. 141, 144 (1999)).
204. Kruger, Companies and Regulators, supra note 63, at 10.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 11.
207. See 40 C.F.R. Part 75. See also Kruger, Companies and Regulators, supra
note 63, at 11.
208. EPA, Part 75 Emissions Monitoring Policy Manual, http://www.epa.gov/
airmarkets/emissions/monitoring.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
209. See id.; Interview with EPA official (Jan. 6, 2006).
210. Kruger, Companies and Regulators, supra note 63, at 2.
211. See id. at 3.
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trade regimes, companies have adopted interdepartmental ap-
proaches to integrate compliance planning into overall business
strategy and have used sophisticated analytical tools to analyze
alternative compliance scenarios. 212 Cap and trade programs al-
low companies greater flexibility to identify and implement the
most cost-effective strategy given its own circumstances. 213
In contrast to enforcement relationships in many traditional
regulatory programs, interactions between regulators and regu-
lated in cap and trade have tended to be "reasonably harmoni-
ous."21 4 According to anecdotal evidence from the Acid Rain
Program, industry officials are "generally satisfied with the inter-
actions" they have with regulators.215 Indeed, there is less friction
between regulator and regulated because regulators are not en-
gaged in an effort to persuade or coerce companies to reduce their
emissions in specific ways. Companies are left alone to make the
decision about when, how, and whether to install control technolo-
gies. 216 Given that regulators are no longer engaged in discretion-
laden judgment calls about typical company compliance, it is not
surprising that enforcement relationships are more harmonious.
The regulators are focused in verifying emission data rather than
influencing compliance choices.
Moreover, citizens and citizen groups are removed from the
enforcement process in cap and- trade programs. 21 7 In traditional
regulation, citizen groups had the opportunity to rally for facility-
specific improvements, particularly when a facility was actually
determined to be out of compliance with regulation. 21 8 In cap and
trade programs, as discussed above, compliance is disassociated
from facility-specific performance. Facilities that are in compli-
ance with cap and trade programs can defend their records with
their compliance status even if they have not taken what would
have been considered economically and technologically feasible
steps to reduce their emissions. In sum, citizen groups have di-
212. Id. at 4-7.
213. Id. at 2.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 13.
216. See id. at 2-3, 13-14; Swift How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at
322.
217. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn & Shipra
Bansal, Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experi-
ment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231, 278-79 (1999) (arguing
that public participation suffers under a pollution trading regime).
218. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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minished opportunities to influence the environmental behavior of
firms under a cap and trade program. 219
Furthering the lack of conflict between the regulator and reg-
ulated, the Acid Rain Program has operated in a manner that has
essentially made noncompliance economically irrational. An auto-
matic penalty is assessed when a company does not have suffi-
cient allowances to cover its emissions. 220 The penalty was
statutorily set in 1990 at $2000/ton of SOx. 221 Adjusted annually
for inflation, the penalty had risen to $2,963/ton by 2004.222 For
the Acid Rain Program's entire lifetime, the price of a ton of sulfur
dioxide on the allowance market remained below the value of this
monetary penalty, averaging approximately $200/ton between
1995 and 2004.223 In addition, the EPA deducts the company's
allotment for the following year by the amount of the
exceedence. 224
Given that sources have several months after the end of the
monitoring year in which to make a final determination of their
total emissions and acquire allowances, any noncompliance with
emission caps would be economically irrational. 225 In this way,
compliance is a mere artifact of the fact that the price of an allow-
ance on the market is lower than the excess emissions penalty. A
rational economic actor will clearly choose to buy allowances in
the market rather than be out of compliance. 226 By having a pen-
219. At least one lawsuit has been filed by a citizen group concerning enforcement
in RECLAIM. See Cmtys. for a Better Env't v. Cenco Ref. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1128
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (alleging violations of several California SIP rules relevant to
RECLAIM).
220. See Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 321.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 7651j (1994). Additional discretionary penalties in the form of
fines or surrender of additional allowances are also provided for, but have been rarely
used. Interview with EPA official (Jan. 6, 2006).
222. AcID RAIN PROGRAM REPORT 2004, supra note 124, at 8.
223. See id. at 6; Kruger, Companies and Regulators, supra note 63, at 13 n.9.
224. Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 321; Stranlund et al.,
Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 12, at 350.
225. Stranlund et al, Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 12, at
346 (showing that complete compliance will be guaranteed as long as the market price
of a unit allowance remains less than both (1) the per unit fine for a cap violation
(making a cap violation economically irrational) and (2) the probability that a report-
ing misrepresentation will get detected times the per unit fine for a reporting viola-
tion and a cap violation (making a reporting misrepresentation economically
irrational)).
226. As recognized by theorists of cap-and-trade regulation, if market price is
greater than the penalty, then firms will be expected to emit more pollution than the
number of allowances they hold. Stranlund et al., Enforcing Emissions Trading Pro-
grams, supra note 12, at 347.
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alty for excess emissions greater than the market price of al-
lowances, noncompliance is essentially designed out of a cap and
trade program. 227
For the first five years of the lifetime of RECLAIM, the situa-
tion was somewhat similar. Allowance prices were extremely in-
expensive, such that noncompliance was basically economically
irrational. 228 However, the RECLAIM program did not include
automatic penalties for excess emissions, which may account in
part for the less than 100% compliance rates. 229 RECLAIM facili-
ties that are found through an audit to have emissions in excess of
their allowances are provided the opportunity to review the audit
and present additional data.230 If after this review, the facility is
found to be noncompliant, the facility's allocation of allowances for
the following compliance year is automatically reduced by the
amount of excess emissions, but there is no automatic monetary
penalty. 231 Rather, RECLAIM administrators may apply admin-
istrative penalties of up to $500 for every 1,000 pound exceedence
for every day the exceedence persists.232 In addition, civil penal-
ties of up to $75,000 per day of violation may be levied.233 In con-
trast to the Acid Rain Program, in the RECLAIM program,
monetary sanctions for cap violations are a matter of administra-
tive discretion.
While not strictly followed by the RECLAIM program, the
EPA lists objective and automatic penalties as a key component of
cap and trade regulation. As stated in its guide to emissions trad-
ing regulation, "[r]egardless of the type and severity of penalties,
they should be objective and automatic. Eliminating penalty ne-
gotiations between regulating authority and emission source pro-
motes impartiality and equity and reduces opportunities for
227. Cf. Stranlund, Costello & Chdvez supra note 144, at 182 (stating that two
elements of the Acid Rain Program are deemed to have led to almost 100% compliance
(1) automatic penalties that are higher than market price, and (2) CEMS which pro-
duce quarterly reports).
228. See, e.g., RECLAIM AuDIT 1995, supra note 132, at 2. ($156/ton for NOx; $142/
ton for SOx).
229. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
230. Stranlund et al., Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 12, at
350.
231. Id.; see also Schwarze & Zapfel, supra note 116, at 288.
232. Stranlund et al., Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs, supra note 12, at
350 (citing SCAQMD's Regulation XX RECLAIM, Rule 2004(d) for the definition of
violations and Rule 2010(c) for procedures for assessing penalties). SCAQMD may
also impose additional permit conditions to prevent further violations. Id. at n.15.
233. Interview with Joseph Panasiti; see also CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
§ 42402 (2001).
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dishonest behavior."234 In addition to excess emissions penalties,
both the Acid Rain Program and RECLAIM provide for penalties
for misreporting emissions.235 These penalties, however, are not
automatically imposed.
IV. COMPLIANCE PLANS TO ENHANCE
RELIABILITY IN CAP AND TRADE
PROGRAMS
The idealized models of cap and trade leave no role for regula-
tors in determining how companies comply. The theory is that the
regulator should be merely the banker or accountant, and the less
involved the regulator is with compliance decisions, the better the
program works. However, in reality, this ideal model may only be
appropriate for the most sophisticated sources in a regulatory uni-
verse. In the Acid Rain Program, where the regulatory universe
consists of exclusively large stationary sources, this model has
worked fairly well. Also, in the Acid Rain Program, a compliance
option emerged that was economically attractive-the use of low-
sulfur coal.236
However, in RECLAIM, where the regulatory universe con-
sisted of less sophisticated sources and no "silver bullets" were
available to reduce emissions, the cap and trade program failed to
produce the type of strategic planning behavior that the ideal
model suggests will occur in cap and trade. 237 Changes to the RE-
CLAIM program instituted in 2001 after the RECLAIM market
failure associated with the energy crisis reintroduced a tool out of
the command-and-control toolbox: compliance plans. This section
first describes the potential tradeoff between reliability and effi-
ciency present in cap and trade programs. It then describes the
problems that the RECLAIM program has experienced in reliably
delivering emissions reductions and discusses how compliance
plans were used in the RECLAIM program. These compliance
plans expanded the roles of the regulators and brought persua-
sion, as well as some coercion, back into the compliance equation.
234. TOOLS OF THE TRADE, supra note 108, at 3-25.
235. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 412, 104 Stat.
2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7651k (2000)).
236. See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 123, at 242, 245-46.
237. Cf. Lesley K. McAllister, Beyond Playing "Banker": The Role of the Regulatory
Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 277-79, 296-97 (2007).
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A. The Potential Trade-off between Efficiency and
Reliability
The implementation of cap and trade programs are most often
justified based on the efficiency improvements they promise. Cap
and trade programs are said to be more efficient mainly because
they allow individual facilities flexibility in determining whether,
when, and how to reduce their emissions.238 A facility that con-
fronts very high costs to reduce emissions may purchase al-
lowances from a facility that has lower costs, thus reducing
compliance costs per unit of pollution overall.239 Companies may
also modify their compliance approach freely depending on
changes in market conditions. Implicit in this flexibility is a re-
duction in the conflict between regulator and regulated that used
to pervade environmental regulation. Companies no longer have
to spend so much time and resources negotiating with regulators
about compliance. Litigation that used to be common with respect
to setting, implementing, and enforcing technology-based stan-
dards is eliminated.
But something of value may also be lost in the different na-
ture of the enforcement relationship under cap and trade pro-
grams: reliability. Reliance on the allowance market to spur
reductions in emissions is only warranted where the market is ad-
equately designed to achieve that end and where market partici-
pants are adept strategic planners. Otherwise, the market may
fail to achieve the desired results. In such a case, there is the pos-
sibility that efficiency and flexibility will be gained at the cost of
reliability and dependability. 240
In traditional regulation, compliance was hinged to environ-
mental performance at each particular facility. Regulators were
charged with understanding the possibilities and constraints re-
garding emissions reductions faced by a facility and engaging in
conversations with facility owners about facility-specific emissions
238. See ACID RAIN PROGRAM REPORT 2004, supra note 124, at 3.
239. See Dallas Burtraw, Alexander E. Farrell, Lawrence H. Goulder & Carla
Peterman, Chapter 5: Lessons for a Cap-and-Trade Program, in MANAGING GREEN-
HOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN CALIFORNIA 5-1, 5-7, 5-22 (Cal. Climate Change Ctr. At UC
Berkeley, 2006), available at http://calclimate.berkeley.edu/ 5_Cap-and-Trade.pdf
[hereinafter Burtraw et al., Lessons for a Cap-and-Trade Program].
240. Cf Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Designing Smart Regulation, in A
READER IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 48, at 305, 308 ("Command and control
regulation has virtues of high-dependability and predictability .... but commonly
proves to be inflexible and inefficient. In contrast, economic instruments tend to be
efficient but, in most cases, not dependable.").
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reductions. Regulators were in a position to persuade and influ-
ence companies to reduce their emissions. In a cap and trade pro-
gram, the role of the regulator is greatly diminished: to act as a
mere accountant or banker. The "persuasion" that facilities expe-
rience to reduce emissions theoretically comes from the market for
pollution allowances. As caps decline and allowance prices rise,
facilities will find reducing their emissions to make financial
sense. They will theoretically engage in the "strategic planning"
behavior to reduce their emissions to the most efficient level.
Abandoning the governmentally-monitored incremental envi-
ronmental improvement typical of traditional regulation, cap and
trade relies on a government-created market to provide the "right"
incentives for pollution reduction. This opens the program up to
one of a variety of possible "market failures." As occurred in the
RECLAIM program, the market might fail because allocation
prices would reach high levels that closed off that avenue of com-
pliance. Assuming the spike in prices was sudden, as it was in
RECLAIM, facilities would be unprepared to reduce emissions in
other ways.
B. Reliability Problems in RECLAIM
Compliance rates are not a very useful measure of the envi-
ronmental effectiveness of a cap and trade program. Compliance
by a particular facility does not effectively communicate whether
that facility has reduced its emissions. Compliance by all facilities
with the overall cap communicates that the cap was met, but over-
all caps may be set too high to be indicative of actual progress in
pollution control and reduction. Rather, the best indication of the
success of cap and trade programs is the amount of emissions re-
ductions actually achieved by a program. On this score, the out-
comes from the two major cap and trade programs are mixed.
The Acid Rain Program has had some important positive re-
sults on emissions reductions. Most significantly, emissions fell
from 8.7 million tons to 5.3 million tons between 1990, when Title
IV was passed, and 1995, when the Acid Rain Program came into
effect. 241 Thereafter, between 1995 and 1999, emissions remained
roughly constant, with an average of 5.3 million tons.242 Compar-
ing the emissions from both Phase I and Phase II sources in the
five-year period from 1995 to 1999 and 2000 to 2004 also yields
241. AcID RAIN PROGRAM REPORT 2004, supra note 124, at 5 fig.2.
242. See id.
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evidence that the program has resulted in emissions reductions.
In the years 1995 to 1999, all sources together emitted, on aver-
age, 12.6 million tons of NOx annually; in the years 2001 through
2004, the same sources emitted an average of 10.6 million tons,
representing about a 15% reduction.243 Notably, the Acid Rain
Program provided a solution to what had been a legislative dead-
lock with respect to the regulation of the county's electric
utilities. 244
The RECLAIM program's record on emissions reductions is
less clear. In contrast to the Acid Rain Program, the RECLAIM
program replaced and subsumed a large set of traditional air pol-
lution regulations that would have reduced emissions at the par-
ticipating facilities in a predictable manner. 245 The RECLAIM
program was designed such that the program would meet an
emission reduction endpoint in 2003 that was equivalent to tradi-
tional regulation.246 Ultimately, in response to the market dis-
ruptions caused by the energy crisis and to ensure that the
program reached this endpoint, SCAQMD resorted to a drastic
change in the program under which compliance plans were re-
quired of most of the market participants.
Even before the energy crisis, there were several signs that
RECLAIM was not creating sufficient incentives for companies to
reduce emissions. In the first three years of the program, 1994
through 1996, emissions remained at roughly the same level as
1993 emissions 247. Years 1997 to 2000 showed some emissions re-
ductions, with an annual average over this period of 17% less than
in the 1994 to 1996 period. 248 Emissions reductions in 2001
through 2003 were much more drastic, steadily decreasing such
243. Calculations by author based on data provided in Id.
244. Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 318-19.
245. See, e.g., ANNUAL RECLAIM REPORT FOR THE 1996 COMPLIANCE YEAR 2-2
(1996) [hereinafter RECLAIM AUDIT 19961 ("RECLAIM was designed to achieve emis-
sion reductions equivalent to the rules and control measures applicable to the uni-
verse of sources that would have been implemented by [SC]AQMD in the absence of
RECLAIM. Therefore, the methodology for determining allocations was developed to
incorporate the emission reduction requirements of the subsumed rules and control
measures.").
246. See THREE-YEAR AUDIT, supra note 125, at 2-1, 2-2 tbl.2 ("Allocations are de-
termined based on historical activity levels and the relative emission controls speci-
fied by the 1991 Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP) and are designed to match
the AQMP emission projections for years 2000 and 2003, thus achieving emission re-
ductions equivalent to the rules and control measures that RECLAIM subsumes.").
247. See RECLAIM AUDIT 1995, supra note 132, at 3-2, 3-3 tbl.3-1; RECLAIM Au-
DIT 1996, supra note 245, at 3-2 tbl. 3-1.
248. RECLAIM AUDIT 2004, supra note 126, at 3-3 tbl. 3-1.
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that 2003 emissions were less than half of year 2000 emissions. 249
However reductions in this period were attributable to the compli-
ance plans implemented in 2001.
As a 2002 EPA evaluation of RECLAIM explains, the program
was overallocated for the first few years of its operation.250 Fi-
nally in 1999, the "cross-over point"-where the program cap
would fall below actual historic emissions-was within sight. In
1999, the NOx cap was 21,013 tons and the actual emissions
were 20,775 tons, and in 2000, the NOx cap was 17,197 tons.
Yet, even at this point, few facilities were actively planning to
install pollution control technologies, which often took a plan-
ning horizon of a couple years to bring on line. As stated by
SCAQMD in its 1999 Annual Audit of the program: Unfortu-
nately, even though [SC]AQMD has published figures [showing
the prediction of the cross-over point] at least once each year
starting in January 1996251 the majority of RECLAIM facilities
have relied on purchasing inexpensive [allowances] to bring
their [allowance] holdings up to the level of their emissions
rather than reducing their emissions to the level of their [allow-
ance] holdings by making capital expenditures on emissions
controls. 252
In the Acid Rain Program, firms seem to have been more ad-
ept at reading and responding to the market signals. Yet, for dif-
ferent reasons, the Acid Rain Program does not provide strong
empirical evidence that companies will fashion compliance plans
that include the installation of pollution control technologies on
their own without the persuasion and coercion exerted by a regu-
latory agency. In the Acid Rain Program, most facilities have
complied not by installing pollution control technologies but by
switching from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal. 25 3 In addition to
providing environmental benefits, the switch to low-sulfur coal ac-
249. See id.
250. AN EVALUATION OF SCAQMD's RECLAIM, supra note 3, at 32; See also STA-
TIONARY SOURCE COMMITTEE, SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., BOARD MEET-
ING AGENDA No. 25, PROPOSAL TO AMEND REGULATION XX - REGIONAL CLEAN AIR
INCENTIVES MARKET 2 (Jan. 7 2005) (stating that "the program was initially over allo-
cated, which led to an under-utilization of available, cost-effective technologies").
251. Such figures are included in each Annual Audit Report (January 1996, Febru-
ary 1997, March 1998, March 1999, March 2000), Three-Year Audit and Progress Re-
port (May 1998), Review of RECLAIM Findings (October 2000), and White Paper on
Stabilization of NOx RTC Prices (January 2001).
252. RECLAIM AUDIT 1999, supra note 174, at 2-9, 3-4.
253. See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 123, at 242, 245-46.
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tually resulted in cost savings.25 4 In Phase I of the program, fuel
switching accounted for 59% of emissions reductions, installation
of scrubbers contributed 35%, and the impact of retiring units con-
tributed 6%.255
In the RECLAIM program, a significant compliance option
that did not involve the installation of pollution control technolo-
gies was not available. 256 RECLAIM facilities, however, did not
anticipate and plan for the installation of control technologies in
the way that environmental regulators had foreseen they would.
As reportedly stated by one EPA official, "For seven years, the pro-
gram did absolutely nothing .... Businesses got used to cheap
credits. Nobody did what they were supposed to do: responsible
planning.'" 257 The EPA's 2002 evaluation of RECLAIM similarly
discusses this issue:
[W]hile long range economic planning is the intent of at least
the larger sources, the market never arrived at the kind of
steady state functioning that could overcome short term market
dynamics and considerations. The initial overallocations and
consequent deflation of credit prices undercut the market driver
for many of the projected decision-making behaviors. 258
In sum, the market failed to develop in such a way that forced
or enabled facilities to undertake the type of short and long-term
planning activities that were expected.
Given the lack of reliability of cap and trade programs, com-
pliance plans may be a key aspect in the design of cap and trade
programs. Indeed, in 2002, SCAQMD conceded that it would have
been "desirable to require facilities to draft compliance plans early
in program implementation."259 Yet, compliance plans have not
formed part of the ideal design of cap and trade. Rather, the em-
phasis in cap and trade design has been leaving decisions about
how to comply with the facilities themselves. Regulators, in the
ideal, are not supposed to be involved in compliance decisions. As
254. Id.
255. Swift, How Environmental Laws Work, supra note 1, at 328-29.
256. AN EVALUATION OF SCAQMD's RECLAIM, supra note 3, at 26 (stating that
"most industries have relied on off-the shelf technologies to achieve reductions in
emissions," while noting that some facilities were able to employ more innovative
methods.)
257. Gary Polakovic, Innovative Smog Plan Makes Little Progress, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
17, 2001, at B1.
258. AN EVALUATION OF SCAQMD's RECLAIM, supra note 3, at 58-59.
259. Id. app. F, at 5.
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explained by SCAQMD, "Initially, [SC]AQMD believed that such
requirements [for the drafting of compliance plans] were inconsis-
tent with the theory of market-based programs, but perhaps a les-
son learned from RECLAIM is that such programs need
mechanisms beyond the market to assure long-range planning by
facilities. " 260
C. Compliance Plans in RECLAIM
The compliance plans incorporated into RECLAIM in the
wake of the noncompliance experienced in 2000 and 2001 provide
a model of how compliance plans can work as either a backup or a
supplement within a cap and trade program.
Rule 2009 of SCAQMD's RECLAIM rules required the four-
teen power-producing facilities to install Best Available Retrofit
Technology by the end of 2003.261 This rule essentially removed
these facilities from the cap and trade program and subjected
them to a technology-based standard. Rule 2009.1(b) required the
forty-one other facilities with NOx emissions of fifty tons or more
to submit compliance plans specifying their approaches to comply-
ing with the facility allocations. 262 These compliance plans were
required to demonstrate that future RECLAIM allocations could
be met, either through installation of controls, purchase of credits,
or other qualified emission reduction strategies. 263 Rule 2009.1(e)
required the twenty-four facilities with annual NOx emissions be-
tween twenty-five and fifty tons to submit forecast reports project-
ing allocations Compliance for Years 2002 through 2005.264 All
compliance plans and forecast report were required to be submit-
ted by September 2001.265
The compliance plans forced RECLAIM participants to plan
over a multi-year horizon. This type of planning had been absent
in the early years of the program. As stated by one industry
260. Id. SCAQMD also stated that "[iut may not be feasible to rely on a 'pure' mar-
ket-based program without requiring enforceable compliance plans from affected fa-
cilities." Id. app. F, at 7.
261. RECLAIM AUDIT 2001, supra note 167, at F-26. See also id. at F-31 (listing
the number of facilities affected by each of the rule provisions).
262. See id.
263. DANNY LUONG, SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., ANNUAL RECLAIM
AUDIT REPORT FOR THE 2000 COMPLIANCE YEAR G-20 (2002).
264. See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., Regulation XX: Regional Clean
Air Incentives Market, Rule 2009.1 - Compliance Plans and Forecast Reports for Non-
Power Producing Facilities 2009.1-4 (2001), available at http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/
reg/reg20/r2009-1.pdf.
265. See id.
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stakeholder that was interviewed regarding the success of the pro-
gram, "as a result [of low allowance prices and RECLAIM market
uncertainty], companies did not make a conscious effort to conduct
long-term planning regarding RECLAIM. Many companies be-
lieved they would always be able to purchase credits."266 With re-
gard to small and medium sized companies, another industry
stakeholder stated that "[miost small and medium size companies
do not plan for the long term, they are more concerned about sell-
ing products and making money. These companies do not have
the resources to look at long-term capital needs."267
The requirement that compliance plans be written and ap-
proved by the regulatory agency furthers the goal of greater infor-
mation exchange between agencies and regulated entities.
Industry stakeholders interviewed about the RECLAIM program
complained about the lack of information provided to them by the
regulatory agency. As one industry stakeholder states "when
[command and control] regulations were stopped, companies lost
the CAC compass and so they did not know what equipment was
available to be installed."268 An industry stakeholder knowledge-
able about small companies stated "smaller companies might ben-
efit from more information about available types of control
technologies. The District should ensure that information ... is
available to those companies that need it."269
A compliance plan rule such as Rule 2009 should be incorpo-
rated as a backup mechanism in a cap and trade program. In the
case of mass regulatory failure, as experienced by RECLAIM in
2000 in part because of the energy crisis and in part because of the
lack of program-induced emissions reductions, compliance plans
implementing technology-based standards should be required of
program participants.
Moreover, compliance plans as called for in Rule 2009.1
should be utilized to supplement cap and trade programs on a
more regular basis. They might be required of all facilities as a
basic requirement for participation. Alternatively, they may be
required at the first instance of noncompliance. Interestingly, the
EPA's 1992 comments on the RECLAIM program during its devel-
266. Interview by Ken Israels, EPA, with industry stakeholder (Jan. 4, 2002).
These interview results were collected by the EPA for the research reported in AN
EVALUATION OF SCAQMD's RECLAIM, supra note 3.
267. Interview by Ken Israels, EPA, with industry stakeholder (Jan. 4, 2002).
268. Id.
269. Interview by Ken Israels, EPA, with industry stakeholder (Dec. 10, 2001).
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opment suggested that the District impose a compliance plan re-
quirement at the first instance of noncompliance. As the EPA
stated, "[w]e believe that facility owners should be required to de-
velop enforceable compliance plans as a remedial measure in
those cases where a facility has exceeded its emission cap for a
given averaging period."270 The EPA then defined "compliance
plan" as a comprehensive statement of how the facility would be
operated to ensure compliance with its emissions cap, including
"appropriate schedules for implementing additional emissions
control equipment or other procedures" to bring the facility into
compliance. 271 The EPA's 1992 recommendation, however, was
not incorporated into the RECLAIM program design.
At least two concerns might be raised about greater use of
compliance plans in cap and trade programs. The first is that it
will erode the efficiency gains possible through cap and trade.
Compliance plans might mandate or influence facilities to reduce
emissions in ways that are not the most cost effective. Moreover,
the process of negotiating and bargaining involved in the genera-
tion of compliance plans itself may introduce inefficiencies. 272 As
pointed out by one commentator, the institution of compliance
plans in RECLAIM is significant because "cost savings in [cap and
trade] systems come from the ability to innovate in compliance
strategy, not from buying or selling allowances." 273
In addition, the use of compliance plans within cap and trade
programs would increase the costs faced by a regulatory agency in
administering the program. Cap and trade programs have been
heralded for their potential to reduce administrative costs.2 7 4 In
the Acid Rain Program, relatively few agency officials are needed
to run the program, and the majority of their time is spent on the
measurement, verification, and tracking of emissions data, tasks
which are increasingly routinized and computerized. 275 The ad-
ministrative cost savings has not been as clear in RECLAIM. In
its 2002 evaluation of the RECLAIM program, the EPA states
that the actual costs of administering RECLAIM have exceeded
270. Letter from Office of Air & Radiation, EPA, to James M. Lents, Ph.D., Execu-
tive Officer, South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. 10 (Feb. 28, 1992), available at EPA,
Guidance Concerning Stationary Source Requirements under RECLAIM, available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/gen/pdf/memo-e.pdf.
271. Id.
272. See Kruger, McLean & Chen, supra note 107, at 115-17.
273. Burtraw et al., Lessons for a Cap-and-Trade Program, supra note 239, at 5-30.
274. See, e.g., Burtraw & Swift, supra note 1, at 10,412, 10,414-18.
275. Kruger, Companies and Regulators, supra note 63, at 10.
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the estimated 5% of SCAQMD's budget and have been "far more
resource intensive than [command and control] regulations."276
The evaluation cites the costs of retraining inspectors to do RE-
CLAIM inspections, the complexity and lengthiness of such in-
spections, and problems in the automation of information
systems.277 In addition to the costs of administering a cap and
trade program, the use of compliance plans implies that regula-
tory agencies again incur some of the same costs involved in tradi-
tional regulation. These include the costs of assessing control
technology options, communicating this information to facilities,
and negotiating with facilities regarding the acceptability of their
compliance plans.
V. CONCLUSION
The term compliance has a very different meaning and signif-
icance in traditional regulation than in cap and trade regulation.
In cap and trade, compliance is no longer a judgment call by regu-
lators related to facility-specific environmental performance. It is
disassociated from the physical processes of pollution control.
Under traditional regulation, being out of compliance meant you
were polluting more than the average facility of your type. In cap
and trade programs, it may simply mean that you didn't buy
enough credits to cover your pollution.
In cap and trade, compliance tells you that facilities are par-
ticipating in the program and holding enough allowances to cover
their emissions. In the two major cap and trade programs consid-
ered in this article, compliance has been an artifact of program
design in most years. If the cap is generous enough, as it was in
the RECLAIM program, all facilities may be in compliance for sev-
eral years without reducing their emissions at all. Also if the pen-
alty for excess emissions is higher than the price of credits on the
open market, then a facility would have to be economically irra-
tional to not comply.
Compliance of a particular facility in cap and trade does not
tell you whether facilities have reduced their emissions. Also,
compliance of all facilities in a cap and trade program doesn't nec-
essarily say anything about whether emissions were reduced to
the extent feasible or to the socially optimal level. One-hundred
percent compliance means that facilities participated in the pro-
276. AN EVALUATION OF SCAQMD's RECLAIM, supra note 3, at 30.
277. Id. at 31.
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gram and held enough allowances to cover their reported emis-
sions. In sum, compliance rates in cap and trade communicate
less than in rate-based regulation.
In evaluating the success of a cap and trade program, one
must look at measures other than compliance rates. As theory is
put into practice in implementing cap and trade programs, much
attention needs to be placed on analyzing how well programs re-
ally work and why. An important question concerns how policy
instruments from traditional regulation and cap and trade regula-
tion might work together. Several commentators have found the
existence of remnants of traditional regulation to be responsible
for difficulties or failures in cap and trade programs. 278
This article argues that compliance plans, a common element
in traditional regulation, may remain useful in a cap and trade
context. Compliance plans involve regulators in compliance deci-
sions in a more extensive way than is called for in the theoretical
renditions of cap and trade. The RECLAIM program, which must
be considered to be the most important cap and trade program yet
implemented alongside the Acid Rain Program, shows that com-
pliance plans may be not just useful, but also necessary to pro-
gram success.
278. See, e.g., R.F. Kosobud, H.H. Stokes, C.D. Tallarico & B.L. Scott, The Chicago
VOC Trading System: The Consequences of Market Design for Performance (Ctr. for
Energy & Envtl. Pol'y Res., Working Paper No. 04-019, 2004), available at http:/!
web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/2004-019.pdf.
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